Indiana Law Journal
Volume 5

Issue 3

Article 10

12-1929

Tort-Proximate Cause-Concurrent Causes

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
(1929) "Tort-Proximate Cause-Concurrent Causes," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 5 : Iss. 3 , Article 10.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol5/iss3/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

RECENT CASE NOTES
her husband." Burns' Ann. St. 1926, Sec. 262. This section has been construed to mean that married women may sue their husbands when the
actions concern their separate property, Dailey v. Dailey, 26 Ind. App. 14,
but in all other cases the common law is left unchanged. Hamm v. Romine,
98 Ind. 177. A wife's right of action for an injury in the nature of a tort
is property, it is the separate property of the wife. Musselman v. Galligher,
32 Iowa 383; The C. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Dunn, 52 Ill. 260; Barnett v. Leonard,
66 Ind. 422. It is submitted that this principle does not bring the present
case under the above statute because that which is denied cannot be assumed, namely, that the wife does have a right of action against her husband for tort.
The following, cases have held that a wife may sue her husband in tort.
Johnson v. Johnson, 77 So. 335; Fitzpatrick v. Owens, 186 S. W. 832;
Brown v. Brown, 89 A. 889; Gilman v. Gilman, 95 A. 657; Fiedurv.Fiedur,
140 P. 1022. "The foundation of legal identity has been so substantially
changed that, except as disabilities have been retained, each has against
the other all the rights of persons not so related." Johnson v. Johnson,
supra. "Should a woman who has been crippled for life through the malicious assault of a brutal husband, go into court and ask for alimony for
her support, there is not a court but what would award her a more liberal
alimony than if she were a strong, able woman. This additional alimony
would be allowed on the ground of the tort she had received at the hands
of her husband. There is no difference in principle between a direct and
indirect recovery for tort." Fiedur v. Fiedur, supra.
There is a growing inclination to construe statutes concerning married
women's rights liberally, and, if possible, to give the wife a right of action
in tort against her husband thereunder and not to consider it as opposed
to public policy to do so. 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 186.
J.A. B.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-TRANSPORTING-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCEPolice officers found appellant sitting in front seat of his automobile, which
was standing between certain barns at the fairgrounds. He was alone.
There were forty pints or half pints of liquor in the back seat. Before he
was arrested, he told the officers that he had gotten the liquor in Osgood.
There was no evidence except that which was given by the state. Appellant
was tried by the court and found guilty on the second count of the affidavit
which charged him with unlawfully manufacturing, transporting, and shipping intoxicating liquor, and by the judgment of the court he was fined
in the sum of $200, and sentenced to imprisonment on the Indiana state
farm for 90 days. On appeal he raised the question of the sufficiency of this
evidence to sustain the convictiojn as charged. Affirmed, Reynolds v. State,
Appellate Court of Indiana, 167 N. E. 544. (August 1, 1929.)
The opinion states: "From this evidence, the court evidently inferred
that appellant drove the automobile from Osgood into the fairgrounds,
with the liquor in it-a reasonable inference, no less so than in the following
cases which were affirmed by the Supreme Court: Lowery v. State, 196 Ind.
316, 147 N. E. 151; Simpson v. State, 196 Ind. 499, 149 N. E. 50; Payne v.
State, 194 Ind. 365, 142 N. E. 651; Lowery v. State, 199 Ind. 180, 156
N. E. 161."
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In each of the cases cited by the court, with the exception of Payne v.
State, which was an appeal from a conviction of grand larceny, the police
officers saw the accused driving his automobile, and the arrest followed
shortly after, under such circumstances as to plainly indicate that the
liquor had been transported in the automobile. The Appellate Court here
approved an inference of guilt from circumstances which were perhaps less
convincing than those which appeared in the cases cited in the opinion.
However, since the court, in reviewing denial of a motion for a new trial for
insufficiency of evidence, will only consider evidence tending to prove guilt
(Lowery v. State, 156 N. E. 161, 199 Ind. 180) the action of the court in
the case under discussion is correct if there was any such evidence.
It appears that the prosecution was brought under the section of the
statute which makes the manufacturing, transporting, and shipping of intoxicating liquor a misdemeanor, Burns' R. S. 1926, See. 2717, rather than
under Sec. 2720, which makes it a felony to transport liquor in a vehicle.
In cases brought under the latter section, the Supreme Court has held that
the mere finding of liquor in a parked automobile will not be sufficient to
support a conviction of the felony of transporting intoxicating liquor.
Thomas v. State, 163 N. E. 593, - Ind. -.
In that case the court, Travis,
J., said: "There is no evidence . . . to sustain an inference that the two
cans which contained grain alcohol were transported the slightest distance
in an automobile, or that the defendant was present in the automobile at
the time it was moving before it was found at a garage where it was being
repaired, or that the liquor in question or any other liquor was in the automobile when it was moving, or that this defendant had anything to do with
the transportation, if the liquor was ever transported, in this automobile,
or that he was in or near the automobile when the automobile moved, or
that he transported the liquor in any other manner. The evidence is
clearly insufficient to sustain the finding."
In view of the uncontradicted testimony of the officer that the defendant
stated he "had gotten the liquor that morning in Osgood" the holding of the
Appellate Court is probably correct. Granting that the Thomas case supra,
was decided under the felony statute which is narrower in terms, and
evidently intended to comprise the offense of "transporting" intoxicating
liquor, in a vehicle, it could hardly be said that the use of the word "transporting" differs in the two sections.
C. W. W.
TORT-PROXIMATE CAUSE-CONCURRENT CAuSES--This was an action by
appellants to recover for a death alleged to have been caused by the
negligence of the appellees. The demurrer to the amended complaint was
sustained. The demurrer denied that the act of appellees was the proximate cause, but that it was the remote cause from which the damage ensued; also the consequences could not have been reasonably foreseen. The
injury was received by deceased while in a frame building used for a waiting room for a fast electric line. The appellee's truck operated by a servant
within the scope of his employment was thrown against the building and
the deceased was crushed by the timbers. The street was wide and the
view was unobstructed. There was a double track and it was alleged if
proper care had been taken by the driver of the auto the approaching train
could have been seen. The car was traveling at so high rate of speed that

